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THE GENERAL AND THE DIPLOMAT: COMPARING 
ANDREW JACKSON AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS ON THE 
ISSUE OF FLORIDA AND THE TRANSCONTINENTAL 
TREATY OF 1821  
By Samuel B. Aly 
In July 1818, secretary of state John Quincy Adams stood alone 
in President Monroe’s cabinet on an issue of national importance. A 
seemingly hot-headed general had overstepped his orders to find a more 
comprehensive answer for Seminole Indian raids on the border between 
Spanish-held Florida and the southern United States. Secretary of war 
John C. Calhoun and secretary of the treasury William Crawford both 
remained vehement over  
Andrew Jackson’s unauthorized conduct in Spanish Florida after the 
President had ordered raids specifically targeting the culpable Seminoles. 
John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson both played critical, 
contradictory roles in the long, arduous saga of the accession of Florida. 
The story culminated in 1821 with the Adams-Onís treaty, examining the 
development of republican sentiment on issues such as slavery, Indian 
relations, and foreign policy.  
The heritage of the two men could not have been more different, 
and the early periods of their lives would come to shape many of their 
later beliefs. Jackson spent his formative years in the backcountry of the 
South Carolina frontier, the son of Scots Irish immigrant parents. The 
cultural legacy formed by his family and community contributed heavily 
to his Anglophobic beliefs and distrust of elites. His experience as a 
fourteen-year old Patriot during the Revolutionary War only cemented 
these feelings: after Jackson refused to clean a British officer’s boots, the 
Tory struck him with his sword, leaving a scar across young Jackson’s 
face that would still be visible in his presidential portraits decades later.1  
After serving brief stints in the Tennessee state legislature and 
Congress, Jackson entered military life as a general of his state’s militia. 
1 H.W. Brands, Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times, (New York: Doubleday, 
2005), 26.  
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A war hawk through and through, “Old Hickory,” as he would come to 
be known, itched for justification to ensure the safety of western settlers 
by eliminating native or foreign imperial threats.2 Shifting territorial 
claims which defined the first two decades of the nineteenth century led 
to instability and constant threat for western expansionists like Jackson. 
His volatile tendencies and deeply held sense of honor led to many 
varied challenges to duel issued to opponents, rivals, and opponents who 
dared slight him or his wife Rachel. Jackson’s most infamous dueling 
incident came as a young man in 1806 when he shot and killed Edward 
Dickinson, although the effects of Dickinson’s death at Jackson’s hands 
was less significant to the public than his allegations that Rachel Jackson 
was a bigamist.3 The enduring legacy of Jackson’s early years was that of 
a hot-blooded Tennessean unafraid to fight for his honor and kin, 
whether that be in a literal or political sense.  
In contrast, John Quincy Adams bore the weight of his heritage 
every time he signed his name, although not always begrudgingly. The 
effects of his father’s participation in the founding and continuation of 
the young nation, a bloody struggle which defined Adams’ life as he 
watched the Battle of Bunker Hill as an eight-year-old in 1775, were not 
without consequence. William Earl Weeks noted that Adams’ heritage 
“stressed achievement but condemned personal aggrandizement,” and 
that his tasks needed to be carried out without any hint of “selfishness or 
personal ambition.”4 This aspect of his personality, more than any 
concrete political ideology, was his father’s effect on Adams’ political 
style.  
The difference between the early lives of Adams and Jackson 
provides a wonderfully exemplary view of the greater picture of early 
nineteenth century America. The young nation was in a process of 
monumental societal change. The political shift from revolutionary 
2 Lynn Hudson Parsons, The Birth of Modern Politics: Andrew Jackson, John 
Quincy Adams, and the Election of 1828, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 26.  
3 Brands, 136. 
4 William Earl Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire, 
(University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 15.  
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leaders to the second generation will be discussed later, but there were 
many other critical changes occurring as well.   
  The War of 1812 had a much more recent, immediate impact on 
Adams and Jackson’s America than did the War of Independence. The 
conflict proved to be the United States’ first real test of sovereignty as a 
nation and also served to expose sectional tendencies that were beginning 
to predominate the national identity. As westward expansion changed the 
political and economic interests of a great deal of Americans, new 
attitudes on issues like slavery, national improvements, and foreign 
relations (particularly with Great Britain) began to emerge.    Slavery 
was decisively bound up in the interests of westerners like Jackson. The 
shift away from tobacco along the Atlantic seaboard towards wheat and 
cotton in the Deep South led to a massive migration of slave 
populations.5 Common estimates place the slave population of the South 
at 700,000 in 1790 and 1.5 million in 1820. Such a shocking change is 
only made more surprising when considering that the Atlantic slave trade 
was abolished in 1808, meaning that the population grew naturally, 
rather than through the importation of slaves from Africa. In addition, 
new developments like the cotton gin and steamboat found their success 
undoubtedly bound up with the development of southern cotton 
plantations; the inventions and complicit industries were mutually 
reinforcing.  
Even before 1812, much of Jackson’s life was linked to the 
institution of slavery. In 1804, he acquired the land which would become 
the Hermitage, his plantation and homestead outside of Nashville.6 
Jackson’s circumstantial entry into the institution in 1788 and his 
“relatively modest number [of slaves] indicates that he was a slaveholder 
rather than a slave trader.”7 The latter profession became increasingly 
lucrative on the domestic front after the abolition of the Atlantic slave 
trade due to the changing regional demands for cheap labor across the 
southwest, but it was one that Jackson never became involved with. 
5 Up to 100,000 slaves moved from the Chesapeake region, known 
for tobacco, to the Lower South in the  
period from 1790 to 1810. 
6 Brands, 148.  
7 Ibid., 73.  
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Nonetheless, Jackson’s opinions on slavery remained unambiguous. He 
understood the interests of his pro-slavery colleagues through experience 
and remained a staunch defender of the institution throughout his 
political career and the rest of his life.   
 With the onset of a period of strong republican sentiment, the 
elder John Adams’ Federalist Party quickly crumbled under a wave of 
broad republican support which indubitably left his son’s political 
influences and convictions in doubt. In fact, the younger Adams did as 
much as he could to distance himself from the partisan politics of the 
time, having seen its divisive effects through his father’s tenure as 
president and during his time in Europe serving as foreign minister to 
Russia.8 As the Republican Party grew and essentially created a one-
party system in America, Adams found his place in the party to be quite 
distinct from other politicians. 
Adams’ early life and political career impressed a fierce internal 
desire to serve the public and seek the greater good, a craving which 
would repeatedly need satisfying over the next few decades. Adams’ 
strong, individualistic attitude only compounded the power of his 
impressive intellectual capacities and budding foreign relations prowess. 
Even early in his political career, as a state senator and subsequently a 
senator for Massachusetts, his nationalist convictions on issues like 
union, neutrality, and expansion of borders would often leave him 
crossing party lines and angering partisan allies and constituents.9 His 
first major roles in government would be abroad, preparing him for 
national prominence upon his return in 1817.  
While Adams was in Europe, Jackson left his life as a well-
known, important figure in Tennessee politics to establish himself on the 
national stage and earn immense popularity with his military heroics in 
New Orleans.10 Before that, though, he played a role in several key 
events across the southwest which prepared him for future exploits in 
Florida. Both his duel with Dickinson and accusations of involvement in 
Aaron Burr’s treasonous plot of 1806 landed him in hot water, as it was 
8 Parsons, The Birth of Modern Politics,  21.  
9 Robert V. Remini, John Quincy Adams, (New York: Times Books, 2002) , 44. 
10 Parsons, The Birth of Modern Politics, 26. 
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never publically determined how large of a role he played in the 
conspiracy.11  
The most consequential of his adventures in this period before New 
Orleans was the Creek War, in which Jackson participated as a military 
leader for the United States. The Creek War developed as part of a larger 
context which provides clarity for the War of 1812, the development of 
the Republican party, and the ideology of men like Andrew Jackson. As 
already noted, Jackson held a deep-rooted hatred for the British. This 
animosity came to manifest itself in his treatment of the Indians.  
During the first decade of the nineteenth century, Shawnee Indian 
leaders Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa propagated a native confederacy in 
the Ohio Territory. Tenskwatawa, meaning “Open Door,” served as a 
shaman, prophet, and religious leader of the confederacy. Their base of 
operations came to be Prophetstown, named by American visitors after 
the shaman himself, in present day Indiana. Although one major aspect 
of the movement was spiritual, Tecumseh served to make it political and 
create a military presence.  
Tecumseh understood the broader scope of the international 
scene in the early nineteenth century and used it to his full advantage, 
playing off the tension between the young United States and Great 
Britain to solidify pan-Indian unity across the western frontier. With the 
outbreak of the War of 1812, Tecumseh and his confederacy, comprised 
of many, but not all major Indian groups in the west, allied with the 
British. As his goals grew grander, Tecumseh’s quest took him farther 
than just his homeland in the Midwest.12  
When Tecumseh made a tour south, declaring his message 
boldly with his renowned oratory abilities, a division between Creek 
tribes created a native civil war which eventually boiled over into a fully-
fledged native independence movement in northern Alabama.13 After a 
series of retaliatory attacks back and forth, the massacre of over 250 
11 Parsons, The Birth of Modern Politics, 23-24. 
12 George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), 28.  
13 Brands, 192-3. 
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American settlers, including many women and children, at Fort Mims on 
August 30, 1813 sparked panic across the southern frontier.14  
After having several attempts at military glory stymied by orders 
from higher up and personal injuries, Jackson finally took this 
opportunity to put his ideology into practice by driving out natives from 
the south. In a sweeping campaign all the way through Alabama to the 
Gulf Coast, Jackson dismantled Creek settlements and forts, civilian and 
military alike, which culminated in the devastating Battle of Horseshoe 
Bend and ended the Creek struggle altogether.15 Tecumseh’s death at the 
hands of William Henry Harrison the previous year had foreshadowed 
the demise of organized Indian resistance in the west, and the Creeks 
were one of the last significant military groups to be abated.16  
The general had silenced the Creek threat. The Treaty of Fort 
Jackson, signed on August 9, 1814, opened up a vast swath of land from 
Tennessee to the Gulf of Mexico for white settlement and advanced the 
interests of Jackson’s allies.17 For Republicans like Jackson and Adams, 
Indian populations became a direct hindrance to westward expansion 
completely incompatible with their interests. Although the fight for 
Indian removal in Georgia would take another decade to come to a close 
under Jackson’s presidency, its origins lay in the period after the War of 
1812. Westerners remembered all too well the immense threat that  
Tecumseh’s confederacy and the Creek War presented. These issues 
became critical for republican nationalists in the westward expansion 
movement, and they would later weigh heavily on the decisions made on 
the federal level under Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, as the 
executive branch carefully negotiated the unique early nineteenth century 
blend of Indian relations and foreign policy.  
  In 1814, after Adams served a prolific five-year term as minister to Czar 
Alexander I and Russia, President Madison called him to serve as 
chairman for the nation’s delegation to peace negotiations with Britain in 
Ghent. Adams succeeded in leading the delegation to peace talks, 
although very little was accomplished in terms of pragmatic change on 
14 Weeks, 27.   
15 Brands, 215-9.  
16 Ibid., 203-4.  
17 Parsons, The Birth of Modern Politics, 29. 
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American issues prior to the war. The gap between British and American 
demands was too broad to cross in many cases. Adams would become 
“especially incensed by the British insistence on granting Indians 
permanent territorial rights,” which would limit westward expansion in a 
more concrete manner.18   
Quincy Adams had reported to his father three of his concerns—
fishing rights, the western and northern borders between American and 
British holdings, and Native American relations—although he had 
ignored two other major issues: impressment and freedom of trade in the 
Atlantic during wartime.19 However, the treaty is significant in the 
broader historical scope.  
In the words of Adams biographer, James Traub, the agreement “marked 
the end of the first, and very fragile, stage of American political 
history.”20 The treaty was a turning point at which the republic’s federal 
government was, at least pragmatically, free of potent foreign military 
threats to the east and able to turn its attention to domestic policy and 
westward expansion. John Quincy Adams stood at the helm of this 
catalyst of a new period of American affairs, and within five years he 
would assume a new role as Secretary of State and establish a legacy by 
his own right.   After resolving peace at Ghent, Adams spent almost two 
years serving as an envoy to Britain. When he finally returned from his 
eight years of European assignments in August 1817 with a healthy 
record of diplomatic successes in tow, Adams carried the reputation of 
being a politician unfettered by politics who had successfully bargained 
for a surprisingly favorable peace agreement.21 Simultaneously, 
Jackson’s heroics in New Orleans in 1815 had provided a similar end, 
that of growing national fame, by entirely opposite means.   
This moment of correlation was one of the first, but more were 
to follow. The two figures found their political origins in a time which 
came to be known by historians as the Era of Good Feelings. Both 
18 James Traub, John Quincy Adams: Militant Spirit¸ (New York: 
Basic Books, 2016), 189.  
19 Remini, 46. 
20 Traub, 195.  
21 Weeks, 21. See also: John Kaplan, John Quincy Adams: American 
Visionary (New York: Harper Collins, 2014), 320.  
50
Tenor of Our Times
Adams and Jackson had to establish themselves on the national stage by 
their merits found in a fully-functioning republic.  
 For decades after the American Revolution, revolutionary 
leaders had played the major roles national politics. The first four 
presidents—Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison—had all 
participated in the leadership of the War of Independence. When James 
Monroe was inaugurated on March 4, 1817, he would become the final 
president of revolutionary fame. Quincy Adams and Jackson had been 
young during the war and it had certainly made lasting impressions on 
them both; however, they were not active players in the war in a 
significant way.  Experiences such as these informed and motivated 
Quincy Adams and Jackson’s actions in regards to the quickly escalating 
Florida issue. Quincy Adams had to approach the situation from his 
newly-appointed position of Secretary of State, which led towards an 
attitude of moderation and pragmatism. Jackson still held a regional 
position, therefore he was more concerned with satisfying his southern 
republican nationalist constituents who despised Spain and feared Indian 
violence.  
Florida had been an enticing prospect for southerners since the 
beginning of the century. Not only would it appease their seemingly 
insatiable desire for land, but Florida’s position made it critical to 
national security. George Dangerfield wrote of a common adage from the 
day:  
“whoever possessed the Floridas held a pistol at the heart of the 
Republic.”22 The fear of Britain using the territory as a base of operations 
in the Deep South had been prevalent during the War of 1812. These 
concepts contributed to Jackson’s conviction of the necessity of a 
military solution to the Florida problem.  
However, Jackson’s invasion of Florida proved to be more 
complicated than his showdown with the British in New Orleans three 
years earlier. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun appointed Jackson 
leader of the campaign against Native Americans on the nation’s 
22 Dangerfield, 127. 
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southern border on Dec 26, 1817.23 Two factors contributed to the 
necessity of the mission: the weakness of Spanish authority in Florida 
and the large number of resettled Creek Indians from the Mississippi 
Valley (the same group Jackson had been responsible for relocating a 
few years earlier) who continued to harbor runaway slaves and cross the 
border to raid American settlers in Georgia. Local independence 
movements against Spanish imperial forces in South America caused a 
dilemma for foreign heads of state—a hot topic of debate in American 
politics in the late 1810s. Because of the turmoil in places like Simon 
Bolivar’s Caracas, Spanish colonial authorities had little time and effort 
to expend on Florida.24 By opposing resolutions to send ministers to the 
newly created and semi-legitimate governments in South America, 
Adams held onto another bargaining chip in the broader game between 
Spain and the U.S., one that he would be willing to wield in future 
negotiations.25  
The general’s actions in Florida were successful from a military 
perspective, but untenable from a foreign relations standpoint. The 
Seminole forces along the border of Western Florida were scattered and 
now posed little threat to Americans on the Georgia side of the border. 
However, the general had gone even farther. Jackson and his men had 
captured the Spanish settlements of St. Marks and Pensacola in May 
1818, established a U.S. customs house in the larger of the two towns, 
deposed the Spanish governor, and executed two British citizens accused 
of colluding with the Seminoles.   
In a situation only aggravated by slow, unreliable lines of 
communication, by June the Monroe administration finally discovered 
the havoc that Jackson had wreaked in Florida. The campaign 
accomplished its primary objectives of dispersing natives and breaking 
their presence in northern Florida, but it also committed various illegal 
and arguably unwarranted acts which placed Monroe in an untenable 
position. On June 18, 1818, Adams wrote that, in particular, Jackson’s 
23 David S. Heidler, “The Politics of National Aggression: Congress 
and the First Seminole War,” Journal  
of the Early Republic 13, no. 4 (1993): 504. 
24 Dangerfield, 128.  
25 Weeks, 104.  
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capture of Pensacola “contrary to his orders” caused “many difficulties 
for the Administration.”26  
  These actions were atrocious corruptions of power, at least according to 
Calhoun, Crawford, and others in the President’s cabinet. Adams 
observed the situation from the opposite perspective, partially out of 
necessity in his role as Secretary of State. He would be the one 
responsible for determining how to approach the Spanish ambassador, 
the American public, and the greater international community, all of 
whom fixed their eyes on Washington in awaiting a response to what was 
surely an unconstitutional action made by General Jackson. Upon 
receiving news in June 1818 of the loss of Pensacola, Don Luis de Onís, 
the Spanish minister in Washington, desired nothing less than a full 
reprimand of the general; in fact, he refused to believe that Jackson’s 
actions against his colonial authorities could have been authorized to any 
degree by Washington.27  
Other members of the president’s cabinet, namely Secretary of 
War John C. Calhoun and Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford, 
were outraged at Jackson’s disobedience. Adams recorded in his diary on 
July 15, 1818 that Calhoun seemed “personally offended” at the idea that 
one of his major generals would exceed his rank by committing actions 
like Jackson had in Florida.28 However, for the president and the 
Secretary of State, the response was not a simple one to formulate.   
Part of this process remains blurred to the historian, for it must 
be noted that Jackson’s orders were ambiguous enough to have been left 
up to interpretation. Whether this was an oversight or an intentional lack 
of clarity given to a man with a temper and a reputation for vengeance is 
still debatable.29 However, on July 21, 1818, Adams listed three reasons 
in his diary for refusing to side with Onís and the Spanish: the admittance 
would imply “weakness of confession”; it would serve as a “disclaimer 
of power in the Executive [which] is of dangerous example and of evil 
consequences”; and the fact that “there is injustice to the officer 
26 John Quincy Adams, The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845, ed. Allan 
Nevins. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 198.   
27 Weeks, 113.  
28 John Quincy Adams, 199. 
29 Brands, 323-4.  
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[Jackson] in disavowing him, when in principle he is strictly 
justifiable.”30  
Adams communicates several key issues in this writing. First of 
all, he addresses one of his main concerns—which was not only foreign 
policy but the power of the executive to form military and foreign policy. 
Any concession made by an apology to the Spanish would surely be 
brought up in the future as justification for removing powers from the 
executive branch of government.31 In the young republic, any federal 
action set extreme precedent, a fact of political life that Adams was 
keenly aware of. Additionally, Adams believed Jackson was justified in 
his actions. During the period between the capture of Pensacola and 
Onís’ demand for punishment to be enacted upon Jackson, neither 
Adams nor Monroe sent additional orders to the general in Florida.32 
Their response was not as swift and easily formulated as Onís clearly 
thought it would be.  
It was at this point that John Quincy Adams made a stand in 
defense of the beleaguered general. One possible motivational factor in 
this was the extreme popularity Jackson had gained across the country, 
particularly the West. His victories against the Creeks earned him a 
heroic reputation in the South, and the Battle at New Orleans widened his 
base of support across the nation.33 A severe punishment would have 
been extremely unpopular with the public; this was not a risk the Monroe 
administration wanted to make as it approached the 1820 election season. 
After several debates within the Cabinet on how to resolve the issue, 
Adams mitigated the initially harsh ideas of Monroe and Calhoun into a 
light reprimand for Jackson and the return of Pensacola to the Spanish.34 
Adams’ bold apology proved crucial in the way in which Monroe was to 
handle the situation.  
This situation made the correlation between Jackson and Adams 
quite clear. The two represented different sides of the same coin—that 
coin being the Republican party, which dominated the Era of Good 
30 John Quincy Adams, 200. 
31 Weeks, 116. 
32 Weeks, 112.  
33 Ibid., 115.   
34 Traub, 222.  
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Feelings and played a major part in the development of the antebellum 
United States. Lynn Parsons wrote, “The Adams-Jackson alliance, if it 
may be called that, was based partly on genuine admiration and partly on 
a mutually shared goal. Each man desired to acquire Florida for the 
United States. Adams hoped to do it by diplomacy and cash, Jackson by 
force, if necessary.”35 The shared objectives clearly aligned on the 
Florida issue, a fact which had a significant impact on Adams’ defense of 
Jackson.   
However, Adams needed Florida to be acquired legally. Whether 
that be through force or diplomacy was a later issue, but to set a 
precedent on the international stage of unconstitutional attacks on foreign 
powers would have been diplomatic suicide for the young republic. In 
July 1818, Monroe included in a letter to Jackson that the general’s 
actions authorized by the executive branch alone would have been 
illegal, that “Congress alone possess the power” to declare war.36  
Adams and Onís continued their long-winded debates and 
negotiations. Onís was an experienced minister; he understood the gains 
he could hope to achieve for his country with its severely limited 
bargaining power.37 Although the Spanish minister claimed that 
Jackson’s misconduct “had set back treaty negotiations, [both Onís] and 
the secretary of state knew that it only gave further emphasis to Spanish 
vulnerability.”38 The negotiations were long and hard-fought.   
Only by conceding that the western border be placed at the 
Sabine River, rather than the Rio Grande, was the Adams-Onís Treaty 
finally agreed upon by the Spanish minister.39 Although the treaty 
granted Adams all of his demands, most importantly the accession of 
Florida, it was not without fault for some nationalists. The move was 
unpopular with westerners dreaming of opportunities for expansion into 
Texas, but that issue would be solved later.   
35 Parsons, The Birth of Modern Politics, 54. 
36 James Monroe, James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, Nashville, July 19, 1818. 
Letter, from The Papers of John C. Calhoun Vol. 2, ed. W. Edwin Hemphill, (Columbia, 
SC, University of South Carolina Press, 1963), 401.  
37 Traub, 223.  
38 Kaplan, 337. 
39 Ibid., 337-8. 
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After the resolution and a brief controversy over land grants, 
which stalled proceedings and gave Adams a fright over what he thought 
had been a huge success, the Adams-Onís Treaty was ratified by the 
Senate in February 1821.40 The Florida territory was now legally and 
unequivocally American land. Furthermore, the treaty addressed issues 
of territory disputes along the western border—an issue which had 
caused tensions since the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. The Spanish had 
disputed the legality of the French sale of Louisiana, and the boundary 
blurred around Texas and farther west. With the treaty in 1820, the 
western border was finally agreed upon; it included the land north of the 
forty-first parallel all the way to the Pacific Ocean. This Transcontinental 
Treaty, as it came to be known, was a relief for the president and other 
interested parties, even if the border had not been set to include Texas.   
 In the meantime, Jackson had been dealing with the political 
ramifications of his invasion. A Senate committee condemned the 
executions of the British nationals, as well as the taking of Pensacola and 
St. Marks.41 In Jackson, men like Calhoun and Clay saw a potential rival 
growing in popularity among their constituency; they strove, 
unsuccessfully, to limit his political growth.42 Fortunately for Jackson, 
nothing came of the committee report on his actions.  
Ironically, he was soon on his way to become governor of the territory; 
its capital was Pensacola.43  
In 1822, Adams wrote, “General Jackson had rendered such 
services to this nation that it was impossible for me to contemplate his 
character or conduct without veneration.”44 The two continued to have a 
cordial relationship until the election of 1824, at least publicly. The split 
of the Republican party and Adams’ deal with Crawford, which would 
assure him the presidency over Jackson, did little to assuage any personal 
animosity between the two men. After Jackson’s allegations of 
40 Kaplan, 348.  
41 Parsons, The Birth of Modern Politics, 52. 
42 Ibid., 53.   
43 Brands, 356.  
44 John Quincy Adams, 274.  
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corruption by Adams and Crawford in the election, the relationship 
between the two men continued to deteriorate for the rest of their lives.45 
However, it was in the Florida situation that the historical 
relationship between the two solidified. The two men had entirely 
different backgrounds and experiences leading up to the affair. Whereas 
New Englander Adams served as a foreign minister and came to thrive in 
the minutia of nineteenth century foreign relations, Jackson brought a 
western war hawk perspective into the Era of Good Feelings with his 
fiery, forceful attitude. Each addressed issues like slavery, westward 
expansion, and Indian relations in his own way. John Quincy Adams and 
Andrew Jackson often shared similar goals, but the means to those ends 
varied entirely.   
45 See Lynn Parsons, “In Which the Political Becomes the Personal, and Vice 
Versa: The Last Ten Years of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson,” Journal of the 
Early Republic 23, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).  
